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This year marks an important crossroads for climate policy. Most member states of 
the European Union have accepted the case for major cuts in greenhouse gas 
emissions. In Britain, for example, the new Committee on Climate Change has 
recommended at least an 80 percent cut in national emissions by 2050.i In the United 
States, the inauguration of the Obama administration also signals a more proactive 
policy agenda, with the new president calling for an 83 percent reduction in 2005 
greenhouse gas emissions levels by 2050.ii Finally, with the hope that developing 
nations such as India and China will join future international agreements, the Parties 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change meet in 
Copenhagen this December to discuss and frame international climate policy and 
cooperation for many years to come.  
The recommendations of the Copenhagen Climate Science Summit held in 
March stress that societies must undergo major transformations if the world is to have 
any hope of avoiding dangerous climate change.iii Yet  despite the obvious human, 
social, and cultural drivers of climate change—including household energy use; 
transportation; unsustainable food, manufacturing, and consumption patterns; and 
population growth—proposed solutions are largely dominated by technology, the 
physical sciences, and economics.iv A key assumption is that new technologies, 
fostered through appropriate market instruments, will lead to the necessary reductions 
in emissions.  
This approach overlooks or, at best, underexploits many of the known drivers 
of human behavior and involves simplifying assumptions with only tenuous 
connection to actual theories and evidence of the factors shaping social practices and 
behavior.v For example, recent modeling from the UK Energy Research Centre 
indicates that in the United Kingdom, lifestyle change could contribute a full 30 
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percent cut in greenhouse gas emissions against baseline, but the analysis assumes 
that almost all households will take up adequate home insulation, the overheating of 
residential buildings will become “socially unacceptable,” and social norms will 
elevate low-carbon vehicles, as well as cycling, walking, and other active modes of 
travel.vi  While the analysis highlights the potential of changes, it begs a number of 
key questions. What represents a “sustainable lifestyle,” and how might competing 
visions of this be reconciled? How might desirable lifestyle changes be achieved? 
Will existing beliefs and choices help or hinder the uptake and diffusion of particular 
low-carbon technologies? And what models and evidence can policymakers draw 
from to encourage the development of appropriate social norms and sustainable 
behavior?  
Of all the human sciences with a potential to contribute to the key task of 
understanding and informing behavior change in the environmental domain, 
psychology, broadly defined as the study of human beliefs and behavior, has been 
particularly underutilized.vii A recent report from the American Psychological 
Association argues that a great deal of theoretical understanding and transferable 
knowledge already exists for encouraging sustainable behavior and coping with issues 
of adaptation.viii However, human behavior, by its very nature, remains complex: 
communities and individuals are adaptable and resilient, but also governed by subtle 
aspects of the situation or context in which they are embedded. Psychologists and 
other social scientists have therefore been wary in the past of addressing some of the 
more normative concerns raised by environmental policy choices ix e.g. attempts to 
persuade the public to accept nuclear energy and radioactive waste sites in the 70s and 
80s.  Equally, climate change is psychologically distant in time and space, involves 
multiple uncertainties (which can be difficult for people to comprehend), and requires 
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extensive cooperation at interpersonal, national, and international levels. 
Understanding the full implications of these challenging aspects of human behavior 
and climate change requires further investigation, while much of what psychologists 
already know will require careful interpretation and adaptation to be useful for 
informing policy.   
 
The Role and Provision of Information 
One enduring assumption of much public policy in the environmental domain 
claims that when provided with information, people will change their behaviors in an 
environmentally beneficial way. It is not hard to fathom why information-based 
approaches remain popular. As beings defined by the capacity to communicate with 
others, humans obtain direct evidence daily of the apparent impact that their own 
words have on others. Research shows, however, that effective communication 
depends upon a range of complex and often subtle factors. Perhaps the most important 
rule of any communication campaign is to first understand the intended recipient. 
Opinion polling has revealed that the majority of individuals in most Western cultures 
perceive climate change to be an important issue.ix  But when placed alongside other 
issues, such as economic interests, climate change is not rated as a high priority.x In 
addition, important differences in attitudes make it unwise to assume that there is any 
single public opinion on this issue.  A substantial proportion of lay people believe that 
scientific controversy still surrounds the anthropogenic causes of climate change, and 
many naysayers and conspiracy theorists believe that climate change is not happening 
or is exaggerated by the media.xi Political polarization also exists on these issues, 
within the United States and Europe, with those on the political right being less likely 
to believe in and to be concerned about global warming.xii The detail and nuances that 
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underlie the headline results highlight the importance of examining public perceptions 
of climate change in greater depth than can generally be undertaken with simple 
opinion polls.  By understanding this complexity, communications and policy 
developments can be better tailored and the likely impacts of these anticipated.   
It is arguably impossible to encounter or even contemplate complex problems 
such as climate change without some kind of context or frame.  Even if we assume 
that we receive only facts from climate scientists, these are passed to the public 
through the media, who filter and adapt the information as they see fit.xiii  Frames can 
be conceptualized as ways of organizing and defining ideas and knowledge in order to 
resonate with particular views of the world, values or ideals;xiv as such, they 
emphasize certain aspects of an issue and de-emphasize others.xv  One popular 
framing portrays climate change in catastrophic, emotive terms.  Mike Hulme, a 
professor at University of East Anglia, discusses the “contemporary discourse of fear” 
surrounding climate change and points to the frequent usage of terms such as “terror,” 
“catastrophe,” and “danger” when discussing climate change,xvi with the implication 
that this type of framing may be counterproductive by encouraging audiences to 
switch off or become habituated to the messages that they receive.xvii  He and others 
also are concerned that fear framing may play into the hands of climate skeptics 
claiming that such messages are “alarmist,”  and increase laypeople’s perception that 
climate change is exaggerated in the media.xviii  However, the psychological literature 
on this point indicates substantial evidence, from domains such as health protection, 
that fear framing will initiate action as long as individuals feel that they have some 
degree of control to act in response to the problem. When control is absent, internal 
psychological defenses, such as denial, can minimize fear.xix Climate communicators 
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should therefore seek to frame emotive messages alongside positive, credible steps 
which people themselves can take.  
Fear frames are only one particular way of conceptualizing and 
communicating about climate change.  Alternative framings emphasize values, equity 
between people, and the morality of action; economic frames, such as the “New 
Green Deal;” and the existence of risk and scientific uncertainty.xx Risk and 
uncertainty framings are particularly important in the current context. While climate 
scientists and modelers have always acknowledged and incorporated complex 
uncertainties and gaps in their understanding, they have preferred to avoid addressing 
specific risks associated with climate change in policy documents.  However, the 
2007 Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
characterizes scenarios and impacts by the likelihood they would occur,xxi and the 
2009 scenarios for the UK Climate Impacts Programmexxii incorporate likelihood-
based regional impacts predictions to aid adaptation decisionmaking for the very first 
time. Risk and uncertainty are set to underpin debates about climate change 
decisionmaking. In turn, engaging the lay public about climate change will need to 
draw on the very best guidance already developed within the field of risk 
communication, which advises to avoid overly technical or patronizing language and 
focus on communicating what really matters for protecting people, choose both 
qualitative and quantitative risk terms with care (possibly also testing their 
interpretation by potential audiences in advance), contextualize risks in everyday 
terms but without raising spurious comparisons, recognize heterogeneous audiences, 
avoid distrusted communication channels or parties, treat communication as dialogue 
(to listen and learn as well as inform), combine information about harmful outcomes 
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with actions people can take to avoid the risk, and always evaluate the effect of 
communication.xxiii   
Sustainability policy in the United Kingdom has begun to recognize the 
existence of multiple publics for communications and other purposes. Research 
conducted by DEFRA under its Framework for Pro-Environmental Behaviors, a 
document designed for decisionmakers and communicators to improve the design and 
implementation of policy interventions, divides the UK population into seven 
segments.  These vary in the extent they are able and willing to act sustainably from 
the Positive Greens, who are very environmentally friendly and have high potential 
and willingness to act sustainably, to the Honestly Disengaged who are fairly 
disinterested, not willing to act, with an average ability to do so.xxiv   The DEFRA 
researchers further identified the types of sustainable behavior members of each 
segment are already likely to engage in, the types of behavior that they could be 
encouraged to engage in, and the motivations and barriers to this behavior.  The 
approach is empirically grounded and important in informing policy initiatives but so 
far has lacked any rigorous theoretical basis.  Theory would be useful here in making 
sense of the reasons why groups differ and when communications previously 
identified as effective may be usefully employed for further groups and behaviors. 
 The DEFRA framework also outlines 12 headline sustainable behaviors, i.e. 
general areas of behavior such as ‘more responsible water usage, as a list of target 
behaviors alongside, importantly, potential ways that these can be promoted.  
However, there is generally little or no information given as to the importance and 
effectiveness of any particular action.  Turning the heating down two degrees is not 
equivalent to installing/increasing loft insulation.  Research from the United States 
indicates that householders believe that biggest energy savings can be gained through 
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curtailment—for example, turning off lights. In reality there are much greater savings 
to be made through efficiency—for example, buying energy saving light bulbs.xxv 
There is a clear need here for psychologists and policymakers to work together when 
making judgments on the behaviors and technologies on which to focus national and 
community efforts.  In this way, communications can be designed to focus on 
behaviors which are most important in the sense of maximizing carbon reductions as 
well as those which have the greatest chance of uptake and maintenance. 
 
An Integrated Approach? 
Although carefully designed, well-targeted communications are an important 
method of promoting sustainable behavior, they are often not enough.  A variety of 
barriers to change prevent people from acting sustainably.  For example, an individual 
may lack the funds to buy a more energy-efficient product, may have more immediate 
priorities, or simply may be reluctant to change his or her current lifestyle (see the box 
on page TK1).  The health psychology literature makes a useful distinction between 
upstream and downstream interventions.xxvi  Downstream interventions refer to 
communications designed to change existing values and beliefs, while upstream 
interventions refer to external structural changes, including legal constraints and 
physical changes to the environment, that force, encourage, or more gently nudge 
people toward different practices and lifestyles. A successful health intervention 
policy or campaign will often involve elements of both,xxvii and there is no reason to 
suspect environmental interventions will be any different in this respect.  
Research has repeatedly demonstrated that one of the biggest predictors of 
future behavior is past behavior: people tend to be creatures of habit who stick to 
regular routines.xxviii Overruling a habit requires deliberate intention and, as a result, 
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interventions that encourage people to be more conscious of their behavioral choices 
increase an individual’s capacity to change.xxix In the United Kingdom, for example, 
many stores have started charging customers a small fee for plastic shopping bags, 
encouraging customers to consider their wastefulness.  Recent research finds that the 
number of plastic carrier bags given out in UK supermarkets has dropped by 48 
percent in the last three years.xxx   
Periods of transition, when routines are already in flux, provide useful 
opportunities to develop new, more sustainable habits.  For example, an intervention 
in Germany that provided people with information and free tickets for public 
transportation shortly after they had moved was found to be particularly successful in 
increasing use of public transport services.xxxi   
Beyond overcoming undesirable old habits, it is also essential to ensure that 
new desirable habits are developed. Often within psychological interventions, people 
are encouraged to repeat their intentions to increase the likelihood that they remember 
them at critical decision points,xxxii, supporting the development of a new habit.  The 
more often new behaviors are performed, the more they are ingrained and reinforced 
until becoming automatic.  The idea of repetition implies a role for behavioral 
incentives. Providing an individual with an incentive—for example, a free bus 
ticket—to perform a particular behavior for a short period of time facilitates the 
development of a new habit that may be continued after the incentive period. Gyms, 
for instance, frequently use this approach to increase their membership.  It equally can 
be applied to uptake of more sustainable habits and services. 
Many environmental interventions in the past have taken either an upstream or 
a downstream approach.  Illustrating the former, consider the low uptake of many 
household energy-efficiency improvements, such as increasing loft insulation, which 
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in the long term are likely to provide overall cost savings.  In fact even with a variety 
of government grants and voucher schemes available in order to incentivize loft 
insulation, many households have not taken advantage of these opportunities. 
Research conducted by the Sustainable Cities Research Institute found that the main 
reasons identified for a poor uptake of insulation schemes were that information 
received was poor and communicated badly and therefore ignored.xxxiii 
 More successfully, the introduction of the mandatory EU energy label in 1995 
brought about a 7 percent drop in the average energy consumption of refrigerators and 
other cold appliances purchased in the United Kingdom.xxxiv Yet two years later, only 
24 percent of UK households reported that the label influenced their purchases.xxxv 
Unfortunately, in the United Kingdom, there was no accompanying communication 
campaign alongside the introduction of energy-efficiency labeling to promote the 
need and reason for this policy.  By contrast, in Portugal a celebrity advertising 
campaign accompanied the labeling; here the reported level of influence of labeling 
was significantly higher (35 percent). Far higher levels still (45 percent and 56 
percent)were found in The Netherlands and Denmark, respectively, where rebates for 
early adopters accompanied labeling and communications.  This demonstrates the 
value of an integrated approach, composed of a raft of complementary measures, in 
promoting behavior change. 
A further interesting and potentially valuable line of research relates to the 
idea of behavioral spillover effects.  In the past few years, there has been particular 
interest in the idea of “catalyst behaviors”: key behaviors that may lead to the 
adoption of other behaviors with a similar underlying ideology.xxxvi Microgeneration 
is an example of a potential catalyst behavior because of its high visibility and its 
inherent requirement of an initial large cash output; it is thought that those who invest 
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in microgeneration are also more likely to follow through with other environmentally 
efficient behaviors.  Such a proposal is intuitively appealing in that if efforts could be 
focused on changing certain behaviors, or perhaps more accurately, a motivational 
route to those behaviors, other beneficial changes may follow.  Indeed a leading 
arguments leveled against many sustainable behavioral intervention approaches is that 
they are developed and integrated into the current economic system, lifestyles, and 
patterns of consumption rather than transforming them. Approaches that target one 
isolated behavior with specific communications or incentives will not bring about the 
fundamental changes in values and thinking to mitigate climate change.xxxvii 
A particularly successful line of research comprised a series of meetings called 
“carbon conversations,” in which participants were encouraged to explore their 
everyday behavior and choices alongside their broader values on climate change 
issues.xxxviii For example people who consider themselves to hold strong pro-
environmental values may not think about these when purchasing everyday goods 
such as food.  This forced participants to consider the meaning of their actions in 
broader terms than perhaps is normally undertaken.  Initial project participants have 
made significant immediate savings of around a ton of CO2 a year and present 
continuing plan to reduce emissions further. Although the reasons for such changes 
require further research, the theory of cognitive dissonance may provide some insight. 
This holds that people who become aware of a conflict between values or attitudes 
that they hold and behaviors that they have engaged in will experience discomfort and 
will adjust one or the other to reduce that feeling.xxxix This may occur, as with carbon 
conversations, through an adjustment of behavior in line with values however this 
may also occur through adjusting values in line with behavior.   
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 Accordingly, reflecting on the reasons for current sustainable behavior may 
be a key way in which related values can be changed.  Indeed it may be that one of the 
ways that catalyst behaviors may encourage further behavior change is because these 
catalyst behaviors encourage adopters to consider and reflect upon their reasons for 
undertaking these.  Further, and importantly, changes in fundamental values tend to 
translate into longer-term behavior changes; so by impacting values, wider change 
may be achieved.  The lesson for policy is that it is important not to neglect the 
broader aims of structural changes implemented with upstream approaches and that in 
fact by maintaining a focus on the more downstream, informational aspects of 
intervention alongside structural changes, then more widespread changes may be 
achieved. 
 
The Social Acceptance of Technology 
Technology and technological solutions are at times credited optimistically 
with the potential to “solve” the climate change problem. In a widely cited article in 
the journal Science, ecologist Stephen Pacala and engineer Robert Socolow argue that 
deployment of a range of existing technologies, from third-generation nuclear power 
to more energy efficient vehicles, can yield major cuts in emissions.xl While their 
analysis demonstrates the extent to which decarbonization might occur if diverse 
technologies can be deployed in time and on a major scale, it ignores the human and 
societal dimensions of the diffusion, acceptance, and uptake of technology.xli The 
innovation process itself is fraught with economic and noneconomic constraints. The 
well-known “valley of death” between demonstration and commercialization is a case 
in point, with low-carbon technologies no different than any other in this regard.xlii 
For individuals to adopt a new technology, it must have a relative advantage over 
 13 
existing technologies (including not only price, but also performance and 
convenience); compatibility with existing needs and social norms; and visibility to 
potential adopters. In addition, the appropriate level of complexity and effort required 
to adopt the technology and opportunities to test innovation in advance must be 
present.xliii  
Research in the long-established field of social studies of science and 
technology also cautions that the use of technology involves often complex 
sociotechnical relationships.xliv At a household level, many of the actions that produce 
greenhouse gas emissions, such as electricity use, are invisible to users in their day-to-
day practices, or are conditioned by the existing energy infrastructure. Even when 
motivated to change, people often do not know what to do or why the adoption of a 
particular innovation is important, or they may lack the ability to affect change. 
Phasing out inefficient incandescent lighting (thought by many to provide superior 
illumination) has met with resistance in several countries, with some households and 
organizations, such as museums, stockpiling traditional bulbs for when they are no 
longer available.xlv An innovative way to make energy use visible is smart metering, 
the use of devices to provide feedback on how much energy is being consumed within 
the home.  Real-time displays in particular help consumers to monitor how much 
electricity they are using and understand which activities use the most energy, 
ultimately encouraging conservation and more sustainable purchasing behavior. 
Recent evaluations of smart meters provide some evidence as to their effectiveness in 
reducing energy usage, with overall reductions varying between 5 and 15 percent.xlvi 
Such behavioral feedback holds considerable promise as a tool for driving change, by 
helping to reduce the psychological distance between our behavior and its impacts on 
the environment.  
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Public acceptability is also critical, in that it may well prove difficult or 
impossible to implement some low-carbon technologies without public support. 
Developers of new technologies often tend to assume that just creating a new machine 
or technical system provides an efficient answer to a defined problem, with little 
regard for people’s perceptions of its risks and benefits or the level of societal uptake 
that may be required.  The history of innovation is littered with examples of 
technologies that stalled because of public hostility.  
Nuclear energy in particular is a case in point. Public concern about the risks 
of nuclear power grew steadily in many Western countries alongside more general 
worries about environmental protection and nuclear proliferation. The overly 
optimistic claims of its early promoters were also exposed by continuing financial 
difficulties, the catastrophic accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, and the 
unresolved problem of finding a solution for the disposal of radioactive waste. Even 
before Chernobyl, opposition to building more nuclear plants in the United States had 
increased from only 20 percent in the mid 1970s to more than 60 percent in the early 
1980s.xlvii During this period, researchers extensively surveyed public risk perceptions 
of nuclear power, finding it to be almost uniquely “dreaded,” unknown to the public 
and to science, with relatively few perceived benefits to society. Distrust in the 
authorities to manage the risk responsibly has also been found to be a powerful 
predictor of opposition to nuclear power in national surveys. Although public attitudes 
to nuclear power on both sides of the Atlantic have moderated somewhat since the 
1980s, there remains an essential ambivalence in many people’s attitudes toward the 
acceptability of this most iconic of the technologies of modernity, whatever its merits 
as a low-carbon electricity sources when in operation.xlviii 
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Researchers have also studied public perceptions and opposition to nuclear 
power within local affected communities, and these studies also show a complex set 
of responses.xlix Opposition is often at its most intense when a nuclear facility is 
proposed for a site without a history of nuclear operations. By contrast, communities 
around existing nuclear sites tend to recognize local benefits—including jobs, 
improved community infrastructure, and lack of other development—that nuclear 
facilities bring alongside an awareness of the potential for environmental pollution 
and accident risks. Many of these issues of public acceptance and opposition, at local 
and national levels, look set to be re-played in relation to the current proposals for the 
renewal of nuclear energy.  And similar controversies are already unfolding with 
regard to some renewable energy proposals, including the siting of onshore wind 
farms in many countriesl and UK tidal energy schemes, such as the Severn Estuary 
proposals.  It might be tempting to dismiss local opposition to renewable energy 
developments in particular as a simple case of Not In My Backyard, but evidence 
from a variety of studies indicates that a range of factors, including concerns about 
destruction of landscape, knowledge of underlying geographic and environmental 
conditions, a lack of control over or input into the planning process, and perceived 
threats to community identity and autonomy, underlie opposition to such 
developments at the local level. li Community engagement and participation will play 
an important role in the processes by which new energy facilities come into being.li 
Above all, research and development of sustainable technologies and innovative 
climate solutions, however well intentioned, must also take at least some account of 
the potential for future public acceptance (or controversy), without which uptake may 
be delayed or derailed entirely.   
 
 16 
Conclusions 
The Copenhagen climate talks in December will need to address the rapid 
social transformations required to meet existing and future climate change targets. 
Such targets will not be attained without also squarely confronting the question of 
human decisionmaking and behavior. Failure to do so will lead to unintended 
consequences when deploying available technologies and decarbonization policies at 
best and a complete failure to move toward a more sustainable world at worst. 
Psychology and other social sciences provide important insights into climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. Environmental psychology itself has been relatively 
marginalized over the years, which highlights the importance of improving the 
capacity of the psychological community worldwide and of fostering further 
systematic research on issues related to sustainability.  Further, psychologists must 
engage more with environmental policy and decisionmakers.lii. 
  In turn, those who seek to encourage behavior change need to be wary of 
simplistic or stereotypical explanations of people’s motivations and actions. Many 
folk theories or “common sense” explanations of human motivations and behavior are 
not borne out by the evidence.  Moreover, reliance on economic instruments and 
incentives is unnecessarily limited and often insufficient. Failing to ground policy 
interventions in empirically based knowledge about human behavior and its drivers, 
whether in communication and engagement programs, economic incentives, 
community initiatives, or deployment of new technologies, is an omission that 
environmental policymaking cannot afford. One practical suggestion arising from our 
analysis is that national governments must consider these issues when drawing up 
policies for shaping future low carbon energy provision and demand management, as 
well as adaptation policy.  In line with this, the 4th assessment report of the IPCC 
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concluded in 2007 that ‘changes in lifestyle and behaviour patterns can contribute to 
climate change mitigation across all sectors’. liii However, the evidence base in the 
main body of the assessment report to underpin this statement was both 
underdeveloped and fragmented in relation to what is already known from the broader 
psychology and social sciences literatures, and especially in comparison to the 
report’s comprehensive treatment of its other topics such as climate science, 
technology choices and energy economics. Accordingly, we would recommend that 
the 5th Assessment Report from the IPCC, currently being outlined, should take up 
and systematically address behavioral and social aspects of potential future scenarios. 
By reviewing in detail scientific and other evidence on the role that can be played by 
behavior change and its drivers within the societal and technological transformations 
that are deemed necessary for a carbon-limited future, approaches to both climate 
change mitigation and adaptation can more fully address human and social drivers, 
alongside the more physical and economic interventions. 
Some segments of the policy and research community have already recognized 
that human behavior will be critical in the fight against climate change. DEFRA’s 
Framework for Pro-Environmental Behaviours is one example, while its Act on CO2 
campaign aims to inform and encourage low carbon choices by consumers.liii In the 
United States, the House Committee on Science and Technology recently passed 
legislation to establish a social and behavioral program at the Department of Energy, 
while a recent report by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences points to the urgent 
need for behavioral research to understand (for example) the reasons why existing 
energy-efficiency measures are not always adopted by consumers, even when it would 
be economically sensible for them to do so.liv  
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Behavioral research as its own narrowly focused niche will not be sufficient. 
Addressing human behavior and climate change requires interdisciplinary and 
integrated approaches that draw on diverse disciplines, including psychology, 
behavioral economics, environmental sciences and geography, sociology, and politics.  
In some cases, an economic approach to change may be the most effective option, at 
least in the short term, while longer term and deeper shifts are likely to be achieved 
through changes in values, lifestyles, and our cultures of consumption, on a far wider 
and systematic scale.  To successfully address climate change, we must use every tool 
that we have, drawing on expertise from all relevant disciplines. 
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SIDEBAR 
 
Perceived barriers to engagement with climate change 
 
Many individual and societal barriers limit engagement with climate change.  In an 
interesting study, led by Irene Lorenzoni at the University of East Anglia, researchers 
reviewed findings from a variety of UK data sources (including focus groups, surveys, 
and semi-structured interviews) to identify some of the main barriers people perceive 
to engaging with climate change.  While not exhaustive, the constraints identified are 
useful in providing a preliminary outline of some of the key factors that interventions 
should target. 
Table 1. Individual Barriers to Engaging with Climate Change 
Individual Barriers Description 
Lack of knowledge Confusion; lack of experience, understanding, and awareness; 
and lack of information contributed to overall lack of 
knowledge about the causes, consequences, and potential 
solutions to climate change.  
Uncertainty and 
skepticism 
Some participants perceived scientific controversy around 
climate change and expressed uncertainty and skepticism 
about the causes of climate change, as well as the seriousness, 
necessity, and effectiveness of actions at both individual and 
international level.   
 
Distrust in 
information sources 
Some participants distrust information received about climate 
change from sources such as the media.  They have the idea 
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that climate change is exaggerated and sensationalized and 
that information received is biased and subject to 
contradictory framings. 
 
Externalization of 
responsibility and 
blame 
In particular, government and industry are thought to be 
responsible for taking the lead in tackling climate change. 
 
Belief in technology Some participants expressed the idea that technology will 
solve the problem of climate change. 
 
 
Belief that climate 
change is a distant 
threat 
A prevalent idea is that climate change is a distant threat, both 
in space, in that it affects other countries and people, and in 
time, in that it is a nearly unimaginable, future problem. 
 
Low prioritization of 
climate change 
Some participants argued that there are more important 
immediate priorities, including family and finances. 
 
Reluctance to 
change lifestyles 
Many expressed concern that being more sustainable will 
threaten their standard of living, be inconvenient, and cost 
more. 
 
Fatalism Some argued that it is too late to do anything about climate 
change, and thus it is a waste of time to try and mitigate 
climate change. 
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“Drop in the ocean” 
feeling 
The scale of the problem leads some to feel individually 
helpless. 
 
Social Barriers  
Lack of political 
action 
Lack of action taken by local, national, and international 
governments has created a distrust of governments to take 
responsibility or meaningful, successful action against climate 
change. 
 
Lack of action by 
business and 
industry 
Many participants perceive that business and industry do not, 
and will not, act sustainably but will act only in the interest of 
profit (“Fat Cat syndrome”). 
 
Free-rider effect Individuals may refrain from taking an interest in, or acting 
on, climate change because they perceive that other people are 
not acting, or because they perceive that other countries are 
not acting. 
 
Social norms and 
expectations 
Current social norms include an expectation to consume.  
Green living is generally seen as undesirable or “weird” or 
“hippy.” 
 
Lack of enabling 
initiatives 
Existing infrastructure and economy locks people into current 
behavioral patterns. More sustainable facilities are costly, 
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inconvenient, sparse, or not viable. 
Source Reference: I. Lorenzoni, S. Nicholson-Cole, and L. Whitmarsh, “Barriers 
Perceived to Engaging with Climate Change among the UK Public and Their Policy 
Implications,” Global Environmental Change 17, nos. 34 (2007): 445–59. 
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